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SUMMARY 
In the last two years M.L. Weitzman (M.I.T.) has been proposing 
the replacement of the fixed wage contract by a form of generalised 
sharing contract whereby at least a substantial component of workers' 
earnings is made of a stake iri'their enterprise performance. This 
institutional change is expected to guarantee the achievement and maintenance 
of full employment of labour without either inflationary pressures or 
sacrifices in real wages; on the contrary; the general price level would 
fall and real wages would increase, due to output expansion in conditions 
of monopolistic competition between firms. These results derive from the 
decoupling of the marginal cost of labour from the level of average earnings, 
which is implicit in the sharing contract. 
In. this paper a: ·sunnnary of the proposal and a comparison with 
other share formulas are followed by a number of critical reflections. 
First the plausibility of Weitzman's assumptions is challenged, for the 
implicit neglect of keynesian and classical unemployment, of the 
persistent inflationary feedbacks of full employment and, above all, 
the lack of workers' participation in enterprise decision making which 
is postulated by the model in spite of continued full employment. Then 
the viability- understood as institutional stability- of Weitzman's 
model is questioned even within the framework of its own assumptions. It 
is argued that the model has systemic instability because of its proneness 
to mergers in the short run, the entry of non-income-sharing new firms in 
the medium run and, above all, a built-in tendency to revert to the wage 
economy in the long run. In any case, if Weitzman's model is accepted, 
the gradual introduction of a wage subsidy is shown to have the same 
beneficial effects of·.in:come sharing without any of its drawbacks. 
THE SHARE ECONOMY 
1. Introduction 
PLAUSIBILITY AND VIABILITY OF WEITZMAN'S MODEL ~ 
D.M. Nuti 
European University Institute, 
Florence. 
The pers~tence and apparent intractability of both large scale 
unemployment and inflation coexisting in advanced capitalist countries 
over the last decade have stimulated a number of new or revamped policy 
proposals, mostly altering the terms of employment contracts, in an 
attempt to cure one illness without aggravating the other. These proposals 
range from the introduction of wage indexation formulas at times of 
accelerating inflation to their abolition when inflation decelerates; 
from the collectivisation of unemployment (i.e. "work sharing") to 
synchronised collective bargaining; from tax-based incomes policy to 
direct wages and prices control - with or without formal or informal 
stipulations of neo-corporatist social pacts to make them acceptable to 
workers as part of a package. 
The latest proposal in this vein is from M.L. Weitzman (1983, 
1984a, 1984b, 1985), advocating the replacement of the fixed wage contract 
by a form of generalised (i.e. economy-wide) sharing contract whereby at 
least a substantial component of workers' earnings is made of a stake in 
their enterprise performance. The idea is not new: forms of income 
sharing or performance related payments abound in modern capitalism 
~ Paper presented at the Arne Ryde Symposium on "Incentive mechanisms and 
problems in major economic systems", held by Lund University at Frostavallen, 
26-27 August 1985. An earlier draft was presented at the Working Group on 
Comparative Economic System, EUI, Florence, on 12 April 1985; and at a 
seminar at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw University, on 26 April 
1985. Acknowledgements are due to Will Bartlett, John Ca~le, Pierre Dehez, 
Jacques Dreze and Saul Estrin for helpful comments, though of course they 
are not responsible for errors and opinions contained in this paper. This 
research is part of an EC funded project on "The impact of workers' 
participation schemes on enterprise performance" conducted by the author 
at the EUI. 
2 
(cooperatives, productivity bargaining, workers' shareholdings), in 
pre-capitalistic formations (share-cropping, sliding scales) and post-
-capitalistic experiments or projects (like the Yugoslav system, the 
labour-managed firm theorised by Ward, 1958 and Vanek, 1970; or Hertzka's 
utopia, 1891). What is new in Weitzman's proposal is the specific 
rejection of workers' participation in decision-making as a necessary 
feature of income sharing; the wide scope of envisaged implementation, 
since the proposal is expected to apply to the bulk of employment in all 
sectors of the economy in order to produce the desired macroeconomic 
benefits; and the emphatic,enthusiasm, to the point of exaggerated 
assertiveness, with which the proposal is put forward as the total 
and miracu~ous answer to the major economic problem of our time: 
'1 
stagflation. Weitzman's evangelism has infected others and received 
wide press coverage 2 
In this paper a summary of the proposal (section 2) and a 
comparison with other share formulas (section 3) are followed by a number 
of critical reflections. First the plausibility of Weitzman's assumptions 
is challen:ged, for the implicit neglect of keynesian and classical 
unemployment (section 4) and of the persistent inflationary feedbacks of 
full employment (section 5) and, above all, the lack of workers' 
participation in enterprise decision making under continued full employment 
(section 6). Then the viability of Weitzman's model is questioned even 
within the framework of its own assumptions; it is argued that the model 
has systemic instability because of its proneness to mergers in the short 
1. Pre-publication comments on Weitzman's book (1984a) by R.M. Solow, J.E. 
Roemer and J.E. Meade, printed in the book's cover, uncharacteristically 
depart from the usually sober style of these authors: " ..• marvellous book 
••. daring •.. practical" (Solow); "One of the most exciting books in 
economics ... the most profound intervention in unemployment policy of 
capitalist countries since Keynes's" (Roemer); "Important, stimulating, 
••• persuasive •.. should be read and inwardly digested by every concerned 
economist, administrator and politician" (Meade). 
2. See for instance S. Brittan in the Financial Times, Monday 25 February 
1985, p.l2; C.P. Alexander in Time Magazine, 20 May 1985. 
I 
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run (section 7), the entry of non-income-sharing new firms in the medium 
run (section 8) and, above all, a built-in tendency to revert to the wage 
economy in the long run (section 9). The last section sums u~ the 
arguments and assesses their impact on the proposal. It should be 
stressed that the objections raised do not refer to income sharing as 
such, only to its miraculous properties as postulated by Weitzman, and 
to its introduction in isolation without the parallel progress of workers' 
particip\tion in decision~aking. 
2. Weitzman's model 
The model proposed by Weitzman is the macroeconomic extension of 
enterprise behaviour in conditions of monopolistic competition in the 
product market, replacing wage labour by net revenue sharing workers. The 
formulation presented here is slightly modified, without loss of general-
ity, to allow for the comparison of alternative labour contracts. 
The monetary revenue of the firm, R, net of all non-labour costs, 
is a function of output and, therefore, indirectly of the employment L 
necessary to obtain that output for the given amount of fixed capital at 
the firm's disposal: 
(1) R R(L) at Lb , R'=O and R"~O. 
Net revenue per worker R/L is a function of employment; at first 
it will r~se because of the presence of overhead costs, up to the 
emplo;n;tent level Le , then it will fall with output increases because of 
falli~· marginal revenue (which will dominate even the possible presence 
r' o~/{ncreasing returns to scale as long as total revenue beyond some point 
:ltalls faster than costs, with respect to output; ·a sufficient condition is 
I ' 
/demand saturation at some level of output, which is a ·~standard 
:feature of monopolistic competition models). For simplicity inputs other 
than labour and fixed capital are ruled out. Therefore: 
- i 
(2) R/L f(L), (at L , f=R') 
c 
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Money earnings ~per worker, in their general form, are defined 
as composed of a fixed component ~ and a share b of net revenue per 
worker R/L after the deduction of ~: 
(3) e = a + b(R/L~a), where ~~1; l~·E_~O. 
The actual values of a and b define alternative labour contracts, namelyl 
wage labour corresponds to ~~· b=O; income sharing corresponds to a~O 
and l>b/0 .. 
Profit-maximising firms employing wage labour under the postulated 
monopolistic competition will employ labour up to employment level Lw 
where R'= w; those paying labour under a mixed (fixed/sharing) contract 
for a>o and 1) b>o will employ workers up to .the level L at which 
s 
R'=a; while with profit maximisation under pure income sharing (a=O, 
l)>b~O) workers will be employed up to the point where R'=O, i.e. up 
to the level Lb • 
On the basis.of this simple analysis Weitzman puts forward the 
following propositions: 
i) for any level of workers' earnings e=a+b(R/L -a) the revenue 
sharing enterprise will offer more employment than the wage labour 
enterprise facing w=e (since a=w-b(R/L-a)<:w), so that the switch from a 
given wage to a formula initially yielding the same level of earnings 
in the economy as a whole will lead to a higher demand for labour, i.e. 
that corresponding to w=a, as if wages had fallen by (w-a)/w (under pure 
sharing, i.e. a=O, the same labour demand will obtain that in a wage 
economy would correspond to zero wages). 
ii) money earnings per worker would fall, but the impact on 
employment would be greater than the effect of wage flexibility (which 
is "desirable per se", Weitzman 1984a, p.l43), because of the decoupling 
of trends in average versus marginal labour cost, the first (=e) not 
having to fall as much as the second (=a) as is the case, instead, for 
5 
W k ' total money earnings in the economy, however, would wage labour. or ers 
not necessarily fall, while real earnings (and real incomes all round) in 
the economy as a whole would actually increase, if the switch to a sharing 
contract was economy-wide, since the proportional price fall would be 
greater than the fall in earnings in the transition from wage to income 
sharing (because the elasticity of the R' function is smaller than that 
of the net revenue per worker curve over the relevant range). 
iii) the labour demand expansion resulting from the economy-wide 
switch from wage contracts to income-sharing is expected, by Weitzman, to 
be greater than existing unemployment. Thus the switch would generate not 
only full employment of labour, but a sizeable permanent excess demand for 
labour, which would ~bsorb all or part of occasional or cyclical demand 
falls i~ the economy without i~ducing firms to pay inflationary wage rises 
bec~use. these would violat~ profit maximisation conditions; indeed, higher 
employment would ha,;e a deflationary impact on prices via greater output. 
iv) In the long run the same level of employment, output, prices 
and earnings would prevail as in a wage ~conomy, earnings gradually 
settling down at the full employment marginal revenue product of labour 
and prices following suit. Excess demand for labour, however, would be 
maintained because the presence of a sharing component in full employment 
earnings will maintain the marginal labour cost to the firm (=a) below 
· 1 revenue product of labour (w*= e~=a+b(R/L-a))' a)~ the full employment marg~na 
Weitzman considers, in passing, alternative sharing formulas, all 
linking workers' pay to firm-specific indicators including the price of 
output, revenue, value added or profit per worker, gross or net. Strangely, 
he regards profits as more stable over time (1984a, p.l37) as well as a 
truer measure of the firm's economic condition. He favours revenue because 
it is "inherently a more precise concept than profits and might be better 
to use for that reason" (ibidem). The essence of the sharing contract is 
that "if workers are laid off or quit, the remaining employees are paid 
more, whereas if new workers are hired, all employees are paid less" 
(1984a, p.83); thus "a share contract is defined to be any compensation 
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function" such that "the level of workers pay is inversely related to 
the level of firm's employment" (1983, p. 768). Weitzman refers to share 
contracts as involving a change in the "numeraire" of the wage contract 
(1984a, pp. 763-4) but this is a misnomer since there is normally a 
difference between a fixed payment (denominated in whatever units) 
and a performance ·related p~~~~; the two are the same thing only for 
sliding scale contracts in which the money wage is index~d to product 
price, and the notion of a change in numeraire is misleading for the 
general class of sharing contracts as defined above 1• 
·The· sWitch··ftom"'wa.ge to income .. sh~ing would then produee the 
costless and simultaneous achievement - hitherto believed impossible -· 
of full employment, stability in the face of sudden demand shocks and 
the control of inflation (which could then be delegated to monetary 
policy without fear of adverse effects on employment). "A share system 
looks very much like a 'labour shortage' economy. Firms eruise around 
like vacuum cleaners on wheels, searching in nooks and crannies for 
extra workers to suck in at existing compensation parameter values. 
Such an economy is inherently recession resistant. Every share firm wants 
to hire more workers at the equilibrium parameter rates, making temporary 
additional profits by absorbing any incipient pockets of unemployment that 
arise or can be found" (1983, p. 777). "It is especially difficult ••• for 
cost-push inflation to get even a toehold in a share firm. Any raising of 
labor's pay above the going level is a temporary effect that the firm will 
automatically offset, over time, by hiring new workers attracted to its 
higher compensation and by flooding its product market with low-priced 
output" (1984a, p. 117). Moreover, 'There is another, more subtle benefit 
of permanent excess demand for labor: it gives dignity to the working man 
and woman, the sense of being significant, useful members of society ••• " 
(1984a, p.l21), due to non-price competition for workers by firms; "gain 
1. Weitzman refers to wages as sometimes "rigidly indexed to money " 
(1983, P· 780) whereas money is the one thing to which money wages or any 
other money payments cannot be indexed by definition. 
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sharing ••• can boost employee morale, increase worker participation, 
improve labor-management relations, foster a sense of partnership, raise 
productivity and so forth" (1984a, p. 142). If the whole world were to 
adopt sharing schemes we would get 11strong export-led growth in an 
enduring world economic boom" (1984a, p. 120). Wage labour is a "perilous 
anachronism" (ibidem, p. 46) while the proposed system is "The superior 
profit-sharing variant of capitalism •.. " (1985, p.44). 
Why, then, is this wondrous institution not used more widely in 
economies plagued by precisely the problems which it is alleged to cure? 
Because, Weitzman explains, the achievement of full and more stable 
employment with lower inflation depends on the nation-wide or at any rate 
large-scale diffusion of sharing schemes, which have no attraction for 
the individual firm and its employees. "The firm and its workers do not 
have an incentive to consider the macroeconomic implications of the 
contract form they are selecting" (1984a, p. 124); there is an "external-
ity", a "public good" or a "market failure" involved (ibidem, p. 123). 
Therefore it is necessary to undertake "a high priority, vigorous national 
program stressing awareness, education and information to infuse a sense 
of social responsibility into the collective bargaining process" (ibidem, 
p. 128); to introduce fiscal incentives lightening the tax burden on the 
share component of earnings (ibidem, p. 130) and to protect firms and 
unemployed workers from restrictive employment practices favoured by 
employed workers (ibidem, p. 133). In Weitzman's own words, "This is 
supply-side economics par excellence" (ibidem, p. 132). 
3. A comparative analysis 
It is interesting to compare Weitzman's analysis of sharing 
contracts' properties with the standard treatment of income sharing 
enterprises in order to understand both the specific features of Weitzman's 
proposal and the ultimate source of its originality. Two models are 
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relevant for comparison since they both replace wage with a net revenue 
share: the dominant Ward-Domar-Vanek model of the labour-managed 
cooperative (Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966; Vanek, 1970) and the Hertzka-Breit 
-Lange model of·workers' free access to employment in the firms of their 
choice (Hertzka, 1891; Breit-Lange, 1982; for an up-to-date bibliography 
on labour-managed firms and employee participation see Bartlett-Uvalic, 
1985). 
Both models envisage enterprises ·op·erating: in 'market economies 
and replacing labour wage with shares in net revenue; indeed workers' 
earnings from labour are derived exclusively from share income ·(a=O) 
and the whole net revenue of the enterprise can be distributed (l~b;>O). 
The share~ of net revenue to be distributed to workers.is decided by 
employees through self-management organs (in Hertzka's model always b=l). 
In ~he Hertzka-Breit-Lange model any worker has the legal right to be 
~mployed by any firm of his choice at. its average distributed net revenue 
per w~rker; in the Ward-Domar-Vanek model, on the contrary, the size of 
employment is decided exclusively by those already employed. 
Optimising behaviour in the Ward-Domar-Vanek takes the form of 
net revenue per worker maximisation through workers' control over the 
size of employment, or rather membership, of the cooperative. The result 
is the opposite of Weitzman's and consists in a restrictive employment 
policy stopping recruitment, in equilibrium, at L (where f=R'); there-
c 
fore in the short run employment is lower and full employment can only be 
reached, in the long run, through the entry of new and the exit of old 
firms. The short run is characterised by, instead of stability, perverse 
response to output price (because a price rise starting from equilibrium 
raises average above marginal net revenue thus encouraging a reduction 
instead of an increase in membership and viceversa) and to fixed capital 
rental (though there are a number of mitigating factors, see Vanek, 1970). 
Thus a small cooperative sector behaving in this fashion will have an 
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anticyclical influence but, if extended to t~e whole economy, the system 
will be highly unstable. Unlike Weitzman, the whole literature on workers' 
income participation schemes has postulated that these are paralleled by 
at least some workers' voice in decision making, expressing concern 
directly or vicariously for the level of R/L and exercising restraint on 
the size of employment (on this see section 6 below). 
The Hertzka-Breit-Lange model ensures the elimination of 
involuntary unemployment through workers' access to any firm of their 
choice as does the later Weitzman model. However in Weitzman's "labour 
shortage" scenario workers have de facto access to any firm because of 
the postulated permanent excess demand for labour, whereas in the Hertzka-
-Breit-Lange model it is their access de jure that is the source, and not 
the consequence, of full employment. In both models the actual level of 
net earnings per man is equalised in the economy as a whole by workers' 
mobility across firms, whereas marginal products (and marginal revenue 
products) of labour are bound to differ across firms (but see section 7 
below and Nuti, 1983). On the contrary, in the Ward-Domar-Vanek model 
average revenue per worker will be equalised only slowly through the 
entry and exit of firms, while within each firm marginal and average 
revenue per worker will tend to be in equilibrium (save for possible 
limits to the cooperative's ability to reduce membership in the short run). 
4. Plausibility: i) neglect of keynesian and classical unemplo~ 
Throughout Weitzman's analysis there is an assumption that 
unemployment is neither keynesian nor classical implicit in the notion 
that lower wages are sufficient to ensure full employment. Classical 
unemployment, here, is understood as a state in which the marginal product 
of labour reaches zero before full employment because fixed equipment is 
not sufficient to provide employment for everybody, regardless of the 
l 
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wage level. Keynesian unemployment is a state in which the marginal 
~ product of labour reaches zero before full employment in spite 
of positive physical productivity of labour because aggregate demand 
- whether in money terms or, worse, in real terms - is insufficient. 
The very notion of firms facing a given demand curve unrelated 
to the overall employment in the econom~is a totally inadequate micro-
foundation for any kind of macroeconomics, though Weitzman makes an 
occasional reference to possible multiplier effects elsewhere of the 
higher level of employment reached in firms switching from wage to 
sharing 
1
• These effects would actually strengthen Weitzman's case for 
sharing contracts, but the impact of a switch to those contracts on 
aggregate demand would be also partly negative, at least in the short run, 
through investment behaviour. In the long run we can accept Weitzman's 
contention that the opportunity cost of labour would be the same under 
both type of contracts and, therefore, the same techniques would be 
favoured ·(1984a, pp. 90-91; investment is not considered in any of his 
other writings on the subject); but in the short run the essence of the 
sharing contract is precisely the lowering of the opportunity cost of 
labour below the equivalent wage for the same level of earnings; thus 
equipment will be scrapped later, formerly obsolete equipment might be 
reinstated if available and new techniques, embodied in new equipment 
which would have been introduced under wage contracts, will not be for 
equivalent sharing contracts. Empirical evidence on the relationship 
between employment and wage levels, whether in. the short or the long run, 
is inconclusive, and it cannot be taken as a matter of course that higher 
employment will be generated by a lower marginal cost of labour. 
It is true that the fall in average earnings associated with 
lower marginal cost of labour under sharing contracts is not as large as 
1. "Now as each firm expands, its new workers spend their wages on the 
products of other firms creating new demand .•• and encouraging further 
expansion" (Weitzman, 1983, p. 764). This implies upward shifts of 
demand curves, with possible inflationary implications (see section 5). 
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the fall which would be necessary under wage contracts to reach the same 
effect and, therefore, the adverse impact of lower money earnings on 
consumption monetary expenditure is not as great as it would be if the 
same marginal cost of labour was to be achieved in a wage economy. It is 
also true that in an economy of universal monopolistic competition ! la 
Weitzman higher employment is associated with lower prices (as long as it 
is not achieved through the·upward shift of demand curves as would be so 
in the case of greater government expenditure) and, therefore, lower money 
earnings would represent higher real earnings and actually boost real 
consumption demand. Nevertheless it still remains a matter of assumption 
and, therefore, of faith that the postulated position of demand curves 
for all of the enterprises in the economy ~ whether these curves are fixed 
or move as a result of the switch to sharing contracts - is such that 
b · at least as large as supply (which in turn aggregate demand for la our LS 
might also be affected, either way, by a change in money and real 
earnings associated with the switch), at least as long as ~0 and the 
matginal cost of labour is not actually zero. Besides, it is sufficient 
to postulate kindred demand curves (for instance, kinked demand curves) 
to open the possibility of discontinuities in marginal net revenue per 
worker and a zero response of employment, even for a=O. 
It is also a matter of assumption that there is enough 
equipment in the economy to provide full employment of labour. This used 
to be a standard assumption in the keynesian approach, likely to be 
satisfied for relatively short lived fluctuations of output and employ-
ment; but now, after over a decade of protracted and drastic recession, 
the closure, dismantling and demolition of plant on a large scale openly 
visible, for instance, in the landscape of the West Midlands or Northern 
France, it is unlikely that an expansion of labour demand would find 
matching equipment on the required scale. 
It might be retorted that these objections invalidate Weitzman's 
claim that sharing contract can deliver full employment, but not the 
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claim that they lead to higher employment than equivalent earnings under 
a wage regime, within the bounds set by either keynesian aggregate demand 
or the availability of plant. But aggregate demand is not necessarily 
invariant with respect to the kind of labour contract prevailing in the 
economy and the adverse impact on investment might more than offset the 
expected boost of real consumption demand. And, if capital equipment is 
a binding constraint before full employment is reached, then public policy 
should encourage investment, instead of promoting measures, like sharing 
contracts, which are acknowledged to discourage it. 
5. Plausibility: ii) persistent inflationary trends 
In the shari~g model three factors are expected to keep inflation 
under control. First, firms refrain from raising prices because this leads 
to the equiproportional increase in the sharing component of earnings, 
thus reducing the advantage obtainable from price rises. Second, firms 
refrain from raising wages because this would go against profit maxim-
isation:.if they can get hold of the labour they want they have no 
incentive to raise wages, while if they are labour-constrained they would 
lower their profit by offering more than the going earnings rate to 
workers already employed as well as workers attracted from other firms. 
Third, if they did pay higher earnings than the going rate and managed 
to ease their employment constraint the concomitant output expansion 
would cause a fall in output price, turning a potentially inflationary 
move into a deflationary one and teaching ·firms not to bid up earnings 
in the labour market in spite of over-full employment. 
Suppose that the switch from a wage to a sharing contract does 
lead to an expansion of employment and real output of both consumption 
and investment up to full employment (i.e. the objections raised in the 
previous section do not apply).~ feedback of real income on demand 
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of the kind contemplated by Weitzman (1983, p. 764, quoted in the last 
footnote above) through multiplier effects, or accelerator effects, or 
both interacting in the familiar way, will shift upwards the ~irms' 
demand curves, unless all demand is totally income-inelastic. This 
recreates the possibility - if not the certainty - of output and 
employment expansion being inflationary, recreating the unemployment/ 
/inflation dilemma which sharing contracts are expected to eliminate. 
The actual terms of this dilemma would be somewhat improved by sharing 
formulas because output expansion along a given demand curve would not 
be inflationary but any upward shift of demand curves due to feedbacks 
of real income on demand would be just as inflationary as any other 
shift of that kind, including that obtained through increases in govern-
ment expenditure. 
If the sharing scheme is successful in reaching full employment 
without inflation it is unlikely to maintain this achievement in the 
face of the postulated persistent excess demand for labour at full 
employment. Persistent overfull employment is bound to raise the 
bargaining power of workers as well as their militancy regardless of the 
official policy of Trades Unions er even their existence. Although an 
individual firm will not have an incentive to bid up wages in spite of 
labour shortages, overfull employment conditions are bound to force all 
firms to concede higher money wages, which will push up prices through 
the uplift of demand curves and/or through firms' mark-up pricing, 
without any restraining impact of output on prices because aggregate real 
income is labour-constrained. Indeed at overall full employment firms may 
well collude between themselves or with workers at the expense of 
consumers, to raise money wages for the sake of industrial peace, 
triggering off the earnings-prices spiral only too familiar from the wage 
system (see Tyson, 1977, who suggests this as an explanation of Yugoslav 
inflation). 
A further inflationary impact of over-full employment - if the 
sharing formula functions as envisaged by Weitzman - is due to its 
- j 
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inescapably adverse effect on workers' discipline, supply of effort and 
labour turnover. We know, from the experience of the Soviet and Soviet-
-type economies characterised by precisely the permanent state of excess 
demand for labour which Weitzman recommends for the capitalist system, 
that these adverse effects of over-full employment are endemic and their 
cost, though difficult to measure, is by no means negligible. (The lesson 
is two-way: Soviet-type economies should learn that without the parallel 
introduction of workers' participation in decision making the introduction 
of sharing components or other firm~erformance-related payments, of a 
kind often recommended and implemented in reform projects in these 
economies, by itself is bound to exacerbate their labour shortage and all 
the problems associated with its persistence.) Like any. other factor 
lowering labour productivity, these adverse effects of overfull employment 
will be inflationary. 
Tt is worth stressing that while full employment is a most 
desirable objective there is no virtue in permanent disequilibrium even 
of a benign kind like overfull employment. The only advantage is the 
instantaneous adjustment to a sudden unexpected demand downturn, but 
there is a continuous price to pay in terms of productivity and anyway, 
if the world was as Weitzman paints it and if one could persuade economic 
agents of it, probably if demand dropped from full employment it would be 
no more difficult to enforce generalised wage restraint by workers or 
price restraint by firms than to replace the wage contract altogether. 
6. Plausibility: iii) lack of codetermination at overfull employment 
The specific rejection of workers' participation in enterprise 
decision making - including employment and income distribution - is 
essential to Weitzman's model (see section 3 above). This is well under~ 
stood by commentators: " ... if it is to work on the Weitzman model, 
management must retain and even strengthen its right to hire and fire. 
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This gives the whole idea a more astringent flavour and separates it 
from the workers' cooperative idea" (Brittan, 1985, p. 12). Lack of 
codetermination is the ultimate source of the divergence of Weitzman's 
results from those of conventional theory of income sharing and his 
only claim to originality. If that assumption is relaxed his results 
fall; since the whole analysis stands or falls with it, it deserves 
closer scrutiny. 
All Weitzman says here is that he takes" ••• as given the age-
-old hallmark of capitalism: private ownership of the means of production, 
where the decisions on output, employment and pricing are essentially 
made by capitalists" (1984a, p. 132). "I can see no compelling reason 
why a capitalist firm should be more prone to allow increased worker 
participation in company decision making under one contract form than 
under ·another" (ibidem, p. 133). "The bargaining power of labor unions 
is not. a natural right" (ibidem, p. 109). "In law and in custom, hiring 
new workers is a management prerogative, not a mandatory subject to 
bargaining •••• The share system is a better game than the wage system, 
but played with strict rules; and one of them is that new workers are 
welcome to join a share firm" (ibidem, p.llO). This is neither evidence 
nor analysis, it is assertion without foundation in economics or political 
economy. 
Freedom of association is a natural right, or at any rate it is 
enshrined in law and custom, and the bargaining power of associated labour 
just as naturally rises, with its relative scarcity, when full employment 
is approached. If this is not regarded as a compelling reason at full 
employment, it must become compelling when excess demand for labour 
arises, let alone when it becomes a permanent, and not just an occasional, 
feature. 
Whether or not Trades Unions exist and whatever are workers' 
legal rights a permanent labour shortage will give workers an informal 
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bargaining power·which they can exercise within the enterprise regard-
less of their formal position. If and when managerial decisions should 
disregard substantially the interes~of employed workers as they 
perceive them, workers can retaliate with appropriatedly gradedresponses 
ranging from lower work effort to absenteeism to strike and industrial 
sabotage; the simple tacit threat of response, in the absence of the 
disciplining and intimidating effect of unemployment, should be enough 
to assert workers' views of what is good for them as opposed to the views 
of other, no matter how enlightened. In Poland in 1980-81 workers' 
informal powers at over-full employment almost brought down a highly 
centra,lised power system an~could only be stopped by the use of military 
power and in spite of this forms of self-management have been introduced 
and are now thriving. Surely o_V$l:fulr-:~mp-lo.yment strength should be 
sufficient to obtain self-management in a capitalist society with a 
liberal and democratic tradition. 
Considerable pressure towards an expansion of workers' 
participation in decision-making would also come from the general 
participatory climate established by the educational and promotional 
campaign envisaged by Weitzman. It does not go against the essence of 
capitalism, on the contrary it is an integral part of the capitalist 
spirit, that risk-taking should be associated with reward and with 
power; thus equity shares, unlike preference shares which are more 
protected from risk, carry a voting right. Weitzman is proposing not 
the "share economy" but a "non-voting share economy". Why ever should 
reward and penalty be separated from responsibility? Why ever should 
workers be exposed to the income risks resulting from decisions in 
which they have no part, more than they are already exposed in the wage 
system with respect to employment risks? 
Weitzman argues that" •.. a wage system does not offer labor as 
a whole a less risky compensation than a share system. It is not true 
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that in a share economy workers are bearing the risk, while in a wage 
economy firms are bearing the risk •••• The relevant issue is not whether 
the firms pool of workers should put all their eggs in one basket - they 
each did that already when they went to work for a single company but 
rather which type of basket is more crush-resistant for whom" (1984a, PP· 
139-40). Paradoxically Weitzman here rehearses the best case for workers' 
participation in decision making in the enterprise - a case that holds 
both under wage and sharing systems. Whatever the relative riskiness of 
wages and income-shares, there is an underlying risk due to practical 
limits on the divisibility of the labour services offered py a worker 
who, unlike the owner of capital, must put all his eggs in only one 
(or sometimes two) baskets. The case for workers' participation is already 
there before the introduction of sharing contracts; certainly it is not 
weakened in any way by the introduction of sharing._ It is a case for the 
"labour-equity economy", recognising that in;,practis;e the employment 
contract involves an investment decision (and a fairly illiquid investment 
at that) on the part of both workers and fi~s. 
Unless there is a.substantial measure of participation in 
decision making, Weitzman':; remarks on income sharing giving "dignity to 
the working man and woman, the sense of being significant, usefu~ members . 
of society ••• " (1984a, p. 121) sound paternalistic and hollow. There can 
be no dignity or fulfilment or sense of belonging in being passive objects 
of other people's decisions; if those feelings were aroused by income 
sharing, they would certainly promote the demand for codetermination. 
It is no accident that the path taken by Weitzman had not been 
taken before: there are excellent reasons for the conventional association 
of income sharing with at least a measure of workers' decisional power. 
That power might be exercised selfishly, or even shortsightedly, but this 
remains to be proven: there is no empirical evidence of the short term 
inefficiency and instability of the labour-managed firm and economy. One 
thing is sure: once employed workers have a say, income sharing will not 
have the effects expected by Weitzman. 
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Purely for the sake of argument, suspend now all the objections 
to the plausibility of Weitzman's model, in order to consider the 
viability - in the sense of systemic stability - of the model on its 
own terms. 
1. Viability: i) systemic mergers 
Weitzman briefly refers to the possibility that his model might 
have systemic instability: " ••• there is always a temptation for the 
individual share ·firm to become a free rider •••• If one share firm 
converts tg a wage contract p~ing the prevailing level of compensation, 
it loses nothing and gains the added short-run flexibility of being able 
to~ay off workers freely when its· business is bad and take on more of 
them when business is good. Nor do the workers care that much because 
there are· always jobs available in a share system •••• A share system 
thus has some tendency to be an unstable social institution under 
individualistic decision making." (1984a, p. 126). 
If one accepts Weitzman's version of how a share economy would 
function it is hard to see why this should be the case. Contrary to 
Weitzman's contention, firms confronted with the choice between a wage 
contract and a sharing agreement yielding equivalent earnings would be 
wise to adopt the sharing agreement. The firms' ability to "lay ofr 
workers" whenever they wish is presumably identical in both systems 
(there is no suggestion in Weitzman that share contracts are tenured and 
i· 
if they were there would be far reaching implicadonswhich would drastic-
ally alter the system and would have to be analysed; Brittan stresses that 
" ••• management must retain and even strenghten its right to hire and 
fire", 1985 p. 12). Before full employment firms would actually have a 
positive incentive to introduce sharing contracts with parameters initially 
set to match the current wage, because they would lower the marginal cost 
of labour below the average cost and be able to expand output and profits; 
if they do not it is because of worker resistence to the possibility of 
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resulting lower money earnings; in any case workers are risk-averse, so 
·that they would require higher average earnings with a sharing agreement 
than with the wage contract. At full employment, neither firms nor workers 
would gain anything from reverting to a wage contract and, if they have 
already experienced the external economies of sharing contracts, there is 
no reason to be found in Weitzman's analysis why they should want to 
disturb current practice. The sharing system would not be introduced 
spontaneously but, if Weitzman was right, once established would be 
happily maintained. 
The sharing economy a la Weitzman is, as it turns out, "an 
unstable social institution" and this systemic instability manifests 
itself in the short~ medium and long run, in different forms, to the 
point of destroying the viability of the system - but not for the reasons 
Weitzman thinks. 
In the short run the system is subject to a concentration 
process, due to the appearance of system-specific mergers, which makes 
the system more monopolistic than its capitalist twin. In the Hertzka-
-Breit-Lange model and in Weitzman labour mobility across firms ensures 
the equalisation of average earnings throughout the economy. Given 
differences in the elasticity of net revenue per worker £-curves at 
those points in different firms, marginal net revenue per worker R' (and 
marginal product of labour) will also differ throughout the economy. 
The divergence of marginal net revenues per worker is made possible by 
the decoupling of the marginal and average cost of labour together with 
the maintenance of a.uniform average cost. This causes a short-term 
inefficiency in labour allocation which, in the longer run, might be 
eliminated by investment replacing labour up to a uniform rate throughout 
the economy but which, in the short and medium run, cannot be eliminated 
by labour redeployment across firms, because sharing firms push employment 
to the point where net marginal revenue per worker is equal to the basic 
element of pay, ~· and this is said to be firm-specific and vary across 
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the economy (though the process determining the relative weight of 
basic and variable elements of pay is not satisfactorily clarified in 
Weitzman's writings). If full employment is reached before firms reach 
the equilibrium point at which !'=~, as long as there are sharing 
components in workers' earnings (i.e. unless we have e=a=w~ for all 
firms, in which case sharing would come to an end, see section 9) there 
is no reason why any particular value of ~ should prevail and establish 
itself throughout the economy; hence net marginal revenue per worker would 
differ. This short-term micro-inefficiency could be overlooked,. in view of 
the claimed victory over ma~ro-inefficient unemployment and inflation; but 
an opportunity for the internalisation of the potential gains from 
redeployment of labour is offered by enterprise mergers~ 
By merging, share firms starting with different marginal net 
revenue per worker can redeploy walkers from that with lower to. that with 
higher·marginal revenue, thus raising joint revenue, altering pay 
parameters to a new uniform scale corresponding to workers' earnings at 
least as large as before the merger. The increment in net revenue can be 
distributed to shareholders, retained, used to raise the earnings of 
existing employees, or to raise average earnings slightly less but 
sufficiently to attract more labour to the new firm arising from the 
merger. Profits from this operation may be temporary but, as Weitzman 
argues about some other profits said to be "transitory and fleeting", 
"they ~re nonetheless real for that" (1984a, p. 120). 
The systemic instability generated by mergers of this kind 
consists in the fact that, in principle, unless we introduce restrictive 
assumptions on static or dynamic diseconomies of size and growth, or 
other rigidities, the merger process can continue until the whole economy 
is encompassed by, if not a single firm, at least a small handful of 
them (for the analysis of this process in the Hertzka-Breit-Lange model,. 
see Nuti, 1983). The more monopolistic nature of the economy could alter 
significantly the resulting output, pricing and employment decisions, at 
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cooperatives is greater than half (assuming identical mortality rates 
among all kinds of firms) in due course the economy will revert to a 
mixed cooperative/wage/share firm economy in Which Weitzman's share firms 
(weighed .by employment-) .are a minority, even if the initial drive towards 
the new system originally had succeeded. 
9. Viability: iii) full employment reversion· to the wage economy 
In the long-run, Weitzman argues, the share economy will settle 
down to a state of full employment characterised, mutatis mutandis, by . 
the same l~vel of earnings per worker, output, price level and of course 
employment that would prevail in a wage economy. Contrary to Weitzman's 
conviction, however, at full employment the share economy would also 
revert to the wage contract; not, as he fears, because of the adoption of 
a "free-riding" strategy on the part of firms, but because of the 
competitive elimination o~the sharing element in workers' pay due to 
firms correctly pricing the opportunity cost of labour at full employment, 
which is something they do not do, though they should do, in Weitzman's 
model. He says that" ••• the best the share firm can do in the long run is 
to hire labour to the point where its marginal value equals the prevailing 
pay ••• " (1984a, P• 90) whereas he should have said to the point where its 
marginal value equals its marginal cost. 
Inexplicably this elementary piece of neoclassical theory is 
neglected: that a firm whose purchase of a production factor is rationed 
at the ruling price or pricing formula must be willing to incur a marginal 
cost for its acquisition equal to the marginal net revenue obtainable from 
it. In spite of excess demand for labour at full employment firms are 
expected not to raise labour earnings over labour marginal productivity at 
full employment because otherwise their profit would fall. Given the 
premises this is, of course, correct. What is not correct is the inference 
that, in view of a sharing component of workers' earnings, basic pay must 
be lower than the full employment marginal productivity of labour (= full 
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employment equilibrium wage) and therefore there must remain a chronic 
labour shortage. The assumption of basic pay remaining below the full 
employment marginal product of labour is simply incompatible with 
optimising behaviour on the part of firms; the marginal cost of labour 
to firms is the basic pay and any competent MIT-trained manager will 
most certainly try, before giving up his search for more workers, 
offering a higher basic pay, without raising the level of total (basic 
Elus sharing) earnings, knowing that workers are risk-averse and that, 
therefore, they will gratefully accept~ in their pay packet, the 
substitution of any amount of contractually fixed pay for an identical 
claim to share income. Put in another fox~ there are cost savings to be 
made for a firm offering a contractually fixed sum of money to workers 
instead of what is to them its certainty-equivalent. But even if workers 
were risk neutral any self-respectingmanager will have to experiment 
with alternative pay parameters and not rest unless the marginal cost 
and marginal revenue per worker are equalised~ in which case only can 
he rest assured that he is not missing a profitable opportunity. 
As a result of this process basic pay ~· which is the marginal 
cost to firms of acquiring new workers, will be made to coincide with 
full employment marginal revenue product of labour w* throughout the 
economy. At that point, the sharing element of workers' earnings vanishes 
and with it Weitzman's share economy. This is a far more fundamental 
systemic instability than that contemplated by Weitzman,·i.e. the 
attraction for firms of retaining the "short-run flexibility of being able 
to lay off workers" (1984a, p. 139) - a flexibility which they neither lose 
nor, if the share economy worked as Weitzman expects, in any case 
would need. Even if none of the objections raised in the previous sections 
applied, and the diffusion of share contracts was able to deliver full 
employment, in the long run (which is not even very long, since Weitzman 
assumes that sharing coefficients are revised "once a year", 1983, P· 769) 
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the system will revert to a wage economy. At best, therefore, Weitzman's 
model is one of a soft-landing on full employment through initial 
reductions in the money earnings of workers, not as drastic as would be 
necessary under wage contracts and, therefore, more likely to be acceptable 
to workers, though eventually full employment money and real earnings 
would be the same under either system. 
But suppose money wage flexibility was sufficient to obtain 
full employment, and fuller employment obtained through lower money wages 
was associated with lower prices and higher real earnings and real incomes 
all round,,, and no other objections held, and the government had to make 
substantial tax concessions to introduce the new system and reap a most 
desirable external effect or "public good". Then why not simply use the 
same fiscal resources to introduce a wage subsidy instead, first on a 
small scale and afterwards, as employment rises and prices fall boosting 
real incomes, on an ever inc/easing scale financed out of the taxation of 
resulting real income increases, up to full employment? Neither firms nor 
workers could possibly object, the public good would be purchased, as it 
should be, out of the public purse but at no real cost to the public under 
the postulated assumptions. This proposal would have all the advantages of 
Weitzman's scheme, without many of the disadvantages such as the drawbacks 
of overfull employment, or the inefficient deployment of labour, or 
monopolistic tendencies - if of course the underlying assumptions are 
correct, while if not correct this would become apparent at the first 
round of wage subsidies which then would be stopped without having done 
any harm, without the dangerous frustration that would follow the 
1 (probable) failure of the economy-wide introduction of share contracts. 
1. For alternative institutional innovations, which do not require 
but are compatible with the assumptions underlying Weitzman's model, 
see Nuti, 1985. 
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10. Conclusions 
Workers' participation in enterprise revenue or profit has been 
introduced in modern capitalism, historically, "as a way of building 
employee loyalty, thus avoiding industrial unrest and unions" as well as 
"a way of putting the employee on the side of management, thereby 
boosting production and efficiency", thus being unpopular with Trades 
Unions (Mitchell, 1985, p.38). Weitzman proposes the economy-wide 
diffusion of sharing contracts relating at least a substanti~l part of 
workers' earnings to the performance of their enterprise. In economies 
characterised by sufficient plant to employ the whole work force and by 
generalised monopolistic competition, the large s.cale introduction of 
share contracts in place of wages is expec.ted to rapidly lead to full 
employment, lower prices and permanent excess demand for labour which 
is not_inflationary and absorbs partly or wholly the shocks of demand 
recession (Weitzman, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1985). 
Both the plausibility of Weitzman' s assumptions and the model's 
viability -understood as the system's capacity to reproduce its 
institutional features once it is introduced - are doubtful on several 
grounds. Usually one good reason for rejecting a case is sufficient, but 
the strength of conviction with which the scheme has been put forward, 
the importance of its claims and the favour it has recejved justify the 
extensive treatment of both the model's assumptions and"functioning. 
Weitzman's model implicitly assumes the absence of classical 
unemployment (i.e. marginal product of labour reaching zero before full 
employment is reached) and keynesian unemployment (i.e. marginal revenue 
of firms reaching zero before full employment). Income sharing at least 
initially will discourage investment by lowering the incentive to replace 
labour which is being made marginally cheaper, thereby slowing down the 
absorption of classical unemployment and possibly offsetting the positive 
impact of income sharing on consumption demand. 
- i 
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If share contracts did succeed in raising employment and output, 
multiplier and accelerator effects might revamp inflation in spite of 
sharing; while, if full employment was reached and the envisaged excess 
demand for labour established and maintained, firms facing the ensuing 
bargaining pressure of labour may collude between themselves or with 
workers at the expense of consumers to raise prices and earnings. 
Moreover, persistent excess demand for labour will lower productivity 
through higher labour turnover and absenteeism and lower discipline and 
supply of effort, pushing up costs and prices. 
It is neither feasible nor desirable to expose workers to the 
risks of income sharing without .parallel expansion of their participation 
in enterprise decision making. The formal and informal bargaining power 
of workers at full employment with excess demand fo~ labour will demand 
and obtain forms of codetermination, which will bring share contracts 
closer to the cooperative model, well known for its restrictive employment 
and output policies. 
Even if none of these objections ap~lied, the model would not be 
viable, i.e. would not maintain its distinguishing institutional features, 
whether in the short, lthe medium or the long run. 
In the short run the equalisation of earnings per workers through 
labour mobility will lead to diverging marginal product or marginal net 
revenue per worker; this inefficiency in labour deployment cannot be 
eliminated other than through enterprise mergers, which raise considerably 
the monopolistic character of the share economy. 
In the medium run, new firms will be either wage firms (because 
workers hired by a new firm have no way of assessing prospective pay) or 
cooperatives (which can take fuller advantage of the proposed privileged 
tax treatment of share income). Unless specific conditions are satisfied 
concerning the proportions of various kinds of firms entering, changing .or 
dying are satisfied, the weight of share firms will gradually dwindle. 
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f 11 1 t average earnings are pegged In the long run, at u emp oymen ~ 
to the full employment marginal revenue product of labour but competing 
·firms have an incentive to raise the fixed component of pay- which is the 
Of labour t o firms - up to the marginal net re;enue p~t marginal cost 
of labour, thus reducing the sharing component: of earnings to zero. At 
best, i.e. if none of the other objectionscounted, the proposal would 
allow full employment to be reached through the downwards flexibility of 
. ~-
labour earnings offered by the share system, but with smaller cuts ~n money 
earnings of workers than would be required to obtain full employment 
through money wage cuts, thereby raising the probability of cuts being 
accepted. 
Is there an alternative way of defeating both unemployment and 
inflation? If we are to believe Weitzman's account of how the economy works 
there certainly is: a wage subsidy would have the same effects on employment, 
output and prices, and if it was introduced at first on a small scale it 
would boost real incomes enabling the government to expand the scale of 
wage subsidies financed out of additional tax revenue until full employment 
was reached; any displacement from full employment would be dealt with in 
the same way if and when it occurred, without the drawbacks of permanent 
labour shortage. 
None of what precedes should be understood or construed as a 
b t Of ;ts introduction on a substantial criticism of income sharing per se, u ~ 
scale without the parallel expansion of workers' participation in enterprise 
decision making without which substantial income sharing would involve a 
· 1· t" d"t"ons and of the gross overclaims for 
regress to pre-cap~ta ~s ~c con ~ ~ , 
d h . t put out by Weitzman. The dependence of the smaller its expecte ac ~evemen s 
part of workers' earnings from their enterprise performance, or better still 
· db f rms of workers' from the overall economy's performance, accompan~e Y o 
codetermination, can have - if the terms are right - beneficial effects on 
productivity and be an. attractive counterpart for workers' acceptance of the 
austerity policies which may be necessary to reach and maintain full 
employment without excessive inflation. 
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